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Regionalisation and Singapore’s Transborder Industrialisation: 
New Perspective on Suzhou Industrial Park 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The dynamics of international economic competition have prompted governments to re-examine 
accustomed policies, and search for alternative strategies, in order to re-position their economies 
for the future. This paper takes a look at Singapore’s search for a competitive positioning in the 
global marketplace, and focuses on the city-state’s much-publicized, and controversial, flagship 
project in China, viz, the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP). This strategic initiative is premised on the 
perceptions that Singapore’s positive reputation with multinational corporations, and ‘guanxi’ (or 
connections) with regional governments, will give the regional sites a strategic advantage in the 
competition for foreign investments. Earlier studies have established that the privileges secured 
for the investment enclaves are vulnerable to changes in the socio-political milieu, and that 
Singapore’s reputation for efficiency, is at risk from the administrative complexities in emerging 
economies. This paper, however, contends that with the ‘realignment of interests’ in 2001, the 
outlook of the SIP project is promising. 
 
 
Key words: Regionalisation - transborder industrialisation – Singapore – Suzhou, China. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore has risen to be Southeast Asia’s premier world-city as well as an essential base for 
multinational manufacturing over the last four decades. Given the inherent constraints of a city-
state, it has been driven to hone its ability in leveraging global resources to sustain its economic 
growth. However, by the mid-1980s, a combination of rising domestic labor costs and increasing 
competition from regional economies created a necessity for Singapore to shift away from a 
labor-intensive paradigm to one more focused on quality and service; one that produced more 
‘value-added’ activities, so as to maintain its technological edge and regional hub status. Along 
with this came a greater need to access foreign markets and their latest technologies, which the 
Singapore government attempted to accomplish in 1988 with an overseas investment program 
(Singapore Economic Development Board, 1988, 1990) that sought to encourage Singapore-
based firms to venture into North America and Western Europe (Caplen and Ng, 1990). Most of 
these investments achieved little in terms of opening up either markets or technology, and instead 
resulted in immense accumulated losses (Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 1993). Clearly, a 
reformulation of strategy was imperative. The new strategy embraced by the Singapore 
government focused instead on expansion within Asia, interest in the region having been fueled 
by phenomenal growth in the economies in the region, notably that of China (Regnier, 1993; 
Pang 1995; Okposin, 1999; Pereira, 2001, 2003).  
 
The main thrust of Singapore’s new regionalisation strategy involved the establishment of 
industrial township projects – or, as they are now more commonly known, ‘industrial parks’ –  in 
China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, and the offering of a wide range of regulatory and monetary 
incentives to assist Singapore firms and individuals to move into overseas markets. This was to 
facilitate the transition of Singapore into a ‘total business centre’, with low-value manufacturing 
relocating to other countries, while the domestic economy restructuring itself into one focused on 
high-value manufacturing. The ‘industrial township’ model was of especial interest because it 
allowed government-linked companies (GLCs), to take a direct role in the regionalization drive; as 
well, the infrastructure required in such townships offered opportunities for small-scale operators 
and service providers to play a role in the development of these flagship projects (Tan, 1995). Co-
operation with the host governments would also lay the groundwork for other collaborative 
ventures beyond the immediate projects. Singapore’s selling point to the host governments was 
the country’s reputation for infrastructural efficiency, stable and corrupt-free administration, and 
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transparent business practices. More than money or expertise, the Singapore brand name was to 
be the city state’s other main contribution.  
 
This paper will focus on Singapore’s much publicized, and highly controversial, Suzhou Industrial 
Park, located in Jiangsu Province, China. To provide the context to this paper, the theoretical 
considerations underpinning this flagship project are sketched in the next section, followed by an 
account of the origins and progress of the case-study park. The analyses are reinforced by 
empirical evidence drawn from our on-site survey of the SIP tenants; case studies, based on in-
depth interviews with selected firms, were conducted at the same time. The final section considers 
the implications of the SIP experience on the ‘exportability’ of the Singapore industrial-
development model, and on a broader note, on the future of Singapore’s transborder 
industrialisation strategies.  
 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1970, 1980, 1988, 2001) sought to offer an analytical basis for 
determining the extent and activities of MNE engaged in cross-border value-adding activities. The 
eclectic paradigm can be applied to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, 
and to look into the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign 
production rather than domestic production, exports or portfolio resource flows through the 
interaction of ownership-specific (O) advantages, internalisation-incentive (I) advantages, and 
location-specific (L) advantages. Firms excogitate the O advantages through exploitation of firm-
specific resources, simultaneously deriving I advantages through the diminution of transaction 
costs. This theory has been extended, in more recent literature, to deliberations on the role of 
physical and institutional infrastructure in the attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); the 
location tournaments for foreign investments (Lundan 2003); the presence of immobile clusters of 
complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996); the agglomeration economies of spatial 
proximity (Krugman, 1991, 1998; Porter, 1996); and the business-government nexus in alliance 
capitalism (Dunning, 1995).  
 
Porter (1994, 2000a, 2000b) and Dunning (1998b), amongst others, have reiterated the 
importance of the spatial dimension, i.e. location-advantages in the new economics of 
competition. Firms’ strategic choice of location thus reflects twin aims; to not only transfer their 
resources to the host countries, but gain access to strategic assets (Chen and Chen, 1998; 
Makino and Delios, 1996) and markets (Davies and Weinstein, 2003).More recent literature has 
widened the ambit of The Eclectic Paradigm to include deliberations on the role of infrastructure 
in the attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); the presence of immobile clusters of 
complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996), and the transactional benefits of spatial 
proximity (Porter, 1996). 
 
Following from this thesis, rationalization theories have argued that the production process should 
be viewed as a value chain, wherein firms attempt to exploit the location-specific advantages of 
the locale to complement the ownership-specific advantages associated with their core 
operations. Singapore’s involvement in SIP represents an effort to synergize superior 
infrastructure and transparent management practices, with the location-specific advantages of 
China. The strategic intent is to create an enclave, within a more certain environment, where 
firms can exploit location-specific advantages with greater ease and security. 
 
 
CHINA-SINGPAPORE SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) was Singapore's most ambitious, and 
controversial, overseas industrial township project. The project cost was estimated at US$20 
billion. The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, envisaged a large-scale project to facilitate 
institutional innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government control and investment in 
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administrative practice or ‘software development’ (Perry and Yeoh, 2000). This project 
encompassed high quality infrastructure, pollution control, ‘one-stop’ non-corrupt operating and 
decision-making processes, minimum entry or performance regulation, transparent financial 
charges, and the delivery of social and welfare services to support an efficient and co-operative 
workforce and a work-oriented community. Three landmark agreements were signed in Beijing on 
February 26, 1994, and CS-SIP was officially launched on May 12, 1994.  
 
The project was a joint venture between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based investors 
known as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD). The 
Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC), a local authority, was formed to 
oversee CSSD’s work. The Chinese consortia’s 35 percent stake was shared amongst 12 
organisations, mainly national state-owned enterprises and investment companies of the Suzhou 
city, Jiangsu province. The Singapore consortium’s 65 percent stake was distributed amongst 24 
organisations, mainly Singapore GLCs, and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China 
Investments). The two consortia retained separate identities and responsibilities, taking up 
projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC, 1999).  
 
SIP was touted as a locale which offers abundant labour, and other local resources, at 
competitive costs, and in proximity to target markets. The primary factors are purportedly 
enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong commitment and 
support from the local authorities, and growing bilateral economic cooperation between 
Singapore and China. The envisaged product of this combination is an industrial park, distinct 
amidst the competition, which presents itself as attractive investment enclave. However, the 
synergy that was envisioned at the onset of the project did not materialize. Singapore’s 
disappointment was indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the 
commitment of the Chinese partners to the project (The Straits Times, 1997, December 5). By 
end-1998, there were only around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce of 6,000 
(SIPAC, 1998). The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, 
which funded the land development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors 
involved in peripheral projects. Official estimates placed Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP at only 
US$147 million (The Straits Times, 1999, August 4). In June 1999, it was announced that 
Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and transfer majority ownership of CSSD to 
the Chinese consortium from 2001 (The Straits Times, 1999, June 30). 
 
Interestingly, investment began to pour in following the handover. To date, SIP has managed to 
secure contractual investment worth US$15.6 billion, and established its status as an investment 
hub for high-tech industries (SIPAC, 2004). Its tenant profile included, significantly, a high 
proportion of American and European investors, with over 70% of their investments in electronics, 
information technology and other high-tech segments. The Park is now an investment hub for 46 
Fortune 500 companies (SIPAC, 2004).  
 
CSSD has plans to be listed by 2005 in China, and possibly in Singapore. The completion of the 
second and third phase of the transportation network and other infrastructure developments, at 
an estimated cost of US$10 billion, is in progress. The infrastructure development for the entire 
70 sq km site is due for completion over the next two years (SIPAC, 2004). Table 1 updates on 
SIP’s operational statistics. 
  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Conventional tools of analysis on SIP have drawn on secondary data from official publications, 
press reports, etc. This is inadequate. The success of the Park hinges in large measure on its 
ability to harness the micro-economic processes of specific firms and industries operating in a global 
environment. In particular, the alliance between Singapore and China should ideally provide a 
suitable framework within which firms can pursue and develop strategies which support their global 
business operations and competitiveness. The driving assumption behind the formation of the Park 
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is that each of the partners offers different, yet complementary, advantages to firms. As such, the 
attractiveness and competitiveness of SIP is the extent to which the firms’ manufacturing operations 
are synergistically linked to the advantage proffered by the Park. 
 
To obtain such primary data, we applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh, et al. (2000) to the 
tenants in SIP. We added further empirical rigor to our field work with case studies of selected 
SIP tenants. 
 
Survey Results 
 
Our survey questionnaire was designed to gauge the differential impact of various push/pull 
factors on firms’ decision to locate in the case-study park, along with the differential impact of 
different types of constraints on their operations. The survey questionnaire focused on three main 
areas. The first set of questions sought to determine the profile of the respondents: type of 
ownership, nature of operations and size of establishment; the second set was structured to 
gather information on the push/pull factors affecting the tenants, and the third set, on the various 
constraints faced by the Park’s tenants. The fieldwork was conducted in July 2004. 
 
 
Profiles of Respondents  
 
There were 53 respondents in SIP, of which 13 were wholly Singapore-owned, 8 were wholly 
China-own, 26 were wholly foreign-owned, 2 were Singapore joint ventures and 4 were joint 
ventures of other countries. In term of operation, 4 manufactured consumer products, 9 
manufacture intermediate products, 5 manufactured capital products, 7 provided in industrial 
services and 30 engaged in other types of operations such as software development or electronic 
devices testing. In term of employment size, 16 employed less than 25 employees, 9 employed 
between 26-50 employees, 12 employed between 51-100 employees, 13 employed between 101-
500 employees and 3 employed between 501-1000 employees. In term of top three target 
markets, 52 had China, 25 have Japan, 11 had ASEAN, 46 had other east Asia countries and 
regions, 29 had USA, 16 had OECD members and 8 had other countries or regions not listed 
above. 
 
Pull Factors  
 
The pull factors of SIP are categorized into political climate, investment climate, physical 
resource, human resource, related and supporting industries as well as strategic location (Table 
2). 
81% of the tenants surveyed stated access to domestic market to be the main draw for locating in 
SIP, making it the top pull factor for the park. The investment incentives that entice companies to 
locate their lower value-added activities in these self-contained enclaves was considered as the 
second most important pull factor for the park by 75% of the tenants surveyed. The political 
commitment from China ranked third with 72% of the respondents citing this factor. This goes a 
long way towards explaining the turnaround in the park’s performance after it was handed over to 
the Chinese partner, given the corresponding increase in the level of political commitment from 
China.  Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was also one 
of the Park’s main draws, with 70% of the SIP tenants surveyed citing it as a pull factor for them 
to locate in the Park. The fifth most significant pull factor was the availability of skilled and 
educated labour, cited by 53% of tenants surveyed, which again explained the location-specific 
advantage offers to firms by SIP.   
Push Factors (Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in SIP) 
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SIP is now an established industrial estate development, but our study alludes to some emerging 
constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the Park. Competition from China-based 
companies and overseas competitions were cited as main constraints by 76% and 62% of the 
tenants surveyed, respectively. Intense competition may discourage companies from locating in 
SIP, thus hindering the future development of the Park. High/rising overhead costs and rising 
labour costs were considered major constraints by the respondents. The ‘cheap’ labour resources 
which drew companies to China seem to be more perception than reality in SIP (Table 3) 
 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results  
 
As many leading MNCs were encouraged by the Singapore Economic Development Board 
(SEDB) to use the Park, it is worth analyzing the different views of these large firms as compared 
to firms of differing sizes, pertaining to the competitive edge and limitations of SIP. Companies 
manufacturing capital products may require stronger infrastructure as compared to firms 
producing computer software or providing industry services, thus a study of these companies is 
particular relevant to examining the effectiveness of the Singapore-style facilities in SIP. Our 
logistic distribution function is formulated to examine these differentiating characteristics. 
 
The (cumulative) logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the 
following form: 
 
   Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
 where: Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question, 
 exp refers to the exponentiation operator and 
 Zi is a linear function of the firm attributes defined as   
    
    Zi = α0 + α1F + α2 L                                                         
 
where: F = 1 if large (> 500 employees for SIP), 0 otherwise 
 L = 1 if producing capital goods, 0 otherwise 
 α0 = constant term 
 αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model is positive and statistically significant (as 
indicated by the p-values), this would imply that the probability of a firm (e.g. large size) choosing 
a particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different size) making the 
choice, after taking into consideration the type of products that the firm produces. 
 
The logit estimations, presented in Table 2, showed that larger firms are not likely to consider the 
presence of major buyers, but the one-stop service provided by SIP, as one of the main pull 
factors when compared to firms of other size, as indicated by the negative (α1 =1.113) and 
positive (α2  = 1.123). From Table 3, difficulty in securing funds for expansion is not much a 
problem for large firm as compared to firms of other sizes, as suggested by the negative and 
statistically significant (α1 = -2.079). Firms manufacturing capital products are more likely to 
choose efficient host government institutions as well as conducive industrial relations, as 
compared to firms manufacturing other type of goods, as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant (α1  =2.279)  and (α2 =1.758).   
  
 
Case Studies 
 
Turning to the case studies, we now present evidence culled from indepth interviews with five 
firms in SIP. All interviews were conducted in July 2004. Primarily, the semi-structured interviews 
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were designed to draw on the firms’ experiential evidence in the Park, viz, the attractiveness of 
the location-specific advantages, and the competitiveness of SIP going forward. 
 
Company A: IT Services 
 
Company A is a spin-off from one of China’s leading IT groups. Established in 2000, the company 
set up its SIP division in the International Science Park in the form of a joint venture with a Hong 
Kong partner. Today, the company has grown to be one of the leading IT service providers in 
China, with the Suzhou subsidiary contributing annual sales revenue of more than US$10 million. 
 
Unlike other companies surveyed, the single most important market for Company A is the 
domestic (Chinese) market; as such, its Suzhou division serves as a “regional” headquarters, 
covering the entire Yangtze area such as Shanghai and Zhejiang. The company chose SIP 
primarily because of the attractive investment incentives as well as availability of land—the 
company regards SIP’s International Science Park as an ideal business location with excellent 
hardware and software support, and which has attracted a significant cluster of big and small IT 
firms. 
 
While the company is generally satisfied with the supply of skilled labour in the Park, one of the 
problems that have been plaguing the company is the shortage of R & D personnel. This is not a 
problem unique to Company A. Although much effort has been put into attracting quality workers, 
the bottleneck persists. Despite this, the company plans to expand its existing operations in the 
Park. It considers SIP an important strategic location. The rising costs, it would seem, do not 
significantly affect the company’s operations.  
 
Company B: Electronics 
 
Company B is a Finnish firm engaged in manufacturing activities. Its Suzhou division is also a 
relatively new establishment (set up in June 2002). The company employs about 200 workers; 
the majority is local, except for a few key personnel in the senior management team. Gaining 
access to the China market was the strategic consideration for their SIP setup. 
 
The company was satisfied with the development and upgrade of SIP’s supporting infrastructure, 
as well as residential amenities. It was specifically mentioned that European and American firms 
were generally the preferred employers compared to most Asian firms, such as those from Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea. Some of the reasons for this observation included better human 
resource policies, as well as more relaxed corporate culture and working lifestyle, etc. The 
company’s respondent was of the view that SIP catered more for American and European firms, 
while many Asian firms have chosen to locate elsewhere, notably to Kunshan, Suzhou New 
District and Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park.  
 
As for the major constraint faced by company B, it was highlighted that while the Singapore-styled 
Central Provident Fund system has helped attract talent to the Park, it has also added to the 
operational costs.  
 
Company C: Industrial Equipment  
 
Company C is a major Japanese manufacturer of industrial equipment. The company has been 
beefing up its production in China, even as it shuttered operations in Japan. In the two years to 
March 2004, it closed down 15 out of its 19 production plants in Japan, while boosting production 
capabilities in China. The group invested some 4,000 million yen to set up the China division. A 
20,000 sq m factory started operations in October 2003. It targets sales at 25 billion yen by 2005, 
and a staff count of 1,000. 
 
The decision to retain only four plants in Japan, focused on high value-added production, is a 
strategic attempt to consolidate plant operations and reduce inter-plant logistics costs. As part of 
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the company’s restructuring, its China division was established in SIP as the group’s regional 
headquarters. A tenant of SIP since October 2002, the company has been banking on the 
Suzhou plant to stay competitive, by delivering high-quality, cost-competitive products to 
customers worldwide. Over the long term, the company has its eyes on China’s market potential, 
aiming to capture 30 per cent of market share by 2010. 
 
Company D: Healthcare Products 
 
Company D is a Japanese-Singapore joint venture. Established in 1994, the manufacturer of 
healthy lifestyle products (such as massage chairs and foot reflexology machines) is one of the 
pioneer tenants in the Park. SIP was the top choice when the Singapore partner decided to 
establish a manufacturing plant in China: 
 
“We wanted to look for a place which can make quality products at reasonable 
price and SIP fits the bill. While SIP is marginally more expensive than the rest of 
China, it is considered a safer option as there is no hidden cost.”  
 
From the interview with the Chief Financial Officer, the company clearly regards a reliable 
management system and a sound investment environment above costs. Indeed, the Singapore 
brand and the positive reputation for excellent infrastructure and corruption-free management 
associated with it are clearly attractive not only to foreign MNCs. 
 
Company D believed that although management know-how can be easily copied elsewhere, 
SIP’s transparent business practice, which has become almost the culture there, is something 
that the other parks would be hard put to emulate. Therefore, “hidden cost” in SIP is very 
low ,compared to other regions in China. 
 
Company E: Automation  
 
Company E is a German manufacturer of automated machines. Established in 1998, its Suzhou 
division remains small-scale, with an employment force of less than 50 workers and annual sales 
turnover of about US$3 million. 
 
Targeted mainly at the China and European markets, the company was drawn to SIP by the 
superior infrastructure facilities and support services, as well as by the variety of investment 
incentives. In addition, the serious commitment demonstrated by the Chinese authorities also 
added to the company’s confidence in SIP. 
 
The company is generally satisfied with the investment environment in the Park, in particular with 
respect to availability of raw materials, supply of skilled labour as well as presence of major 
buyers. Company E is located in a typically Singapore-styled industrial estate, together with many 
other manufacturers, many whom are the company’s direct customers. 
 
Like other respondents, the company is facing the problem of rising labour and overhead costs. 
While the company is planning to expand its current operations in the Park, it now has to consider 
the increasing competition from locally based competitors, which is “getting brutal”, as quoted 
from the manager who was interviewed.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Most of the companies interviewed have expressed general satisfaction with SIP’s infrastructure 
and management, as well as the market environment. While proximity to markets was one of the 
pull factors indicated by the interviewees, they were quick to point out that the Singapore-styled 
environment was one of the most important reasons for their companies’ decision to locate in SIP, 
rather than other alternative sites elsewhere in China. In addition, the investment incentives 
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offered also added to SIP’s attractiveness. At the initial stage of the Park’s development, 
Singapore’s reputation in industrial management had been a huge draw factor not only to MNCs, 
but also to Singaporean SMEs, who consider SIP a “safer” choice without the plague of “hidden 
costs” commonly found in other regions in China. 
 
It seems that SIP has been able to retain this advantage, despite concern over rising competition 
from surrounding areas. Most of the firms interviewed still cited excellent general infrastructure as 
an important consideration in selecting their location. Contrast to the popular perception, the 
transfer of ownership and management control in 2001 was not a cause of concern to the Park’s 
tenants or, for that matter, to potential entrants.  Most welcomed the change as costs in the Park 
fell following the transfer.  Significantly, the Chinese management, primarily represented by 
Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC), is perceived to be sufficiently 
competent to run the area as efficiently as their Singapore partners had. This has also been 
reflected in the second and third phase of the Park’s development, where the Chinese developers 
have been following closely the Singapore-style industrial-township model.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Singapore's policymakers have played great faith in SIP’s success. This initial optimism was not 
fully justified, at least in the early years of the Park’s establishment. The protracted difficulties are 
well documented2. Our study contends that the years of experimentation in adapting Singapore’s 
development software (SIPAC, 2004), and the transfer of ownership and management to the 
Chinese partners, have realigned the interest of the key stakeholders. The exportability of the 
Singapore model is now more apparent and, prima facie, this has offered the Park an edge over 
the competition. 
 
The measured success of the Park has demonstrated the appeal of the Singapore industrial-
development model. The investments attracted have provided the basis from which the Park can 
grow. However, our study points to the need for realignment of interests which, pari passu, 
translates into an incentive structure for the local partners to make the project a success. As well, 
this study contends that planners should take cognizance of the broad host environment in which 
the project is being ‘cloned’. That considered, the SIP experiment may well provide the model for 
replication in other emerging markets. 
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Table 1: CS-SIP operation statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Council and SembPark Management Pte Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
General Information on CS-SIP    (Feb 2004) 
Country Profile of Tenants (by % of size of 
investment) 
Scale of Development (hectares) 7,000 
Investment by Developer (US$ 
million) 
12,400 
Committed Tenants 573 
Area Taken Up (hectares) 980 
Investment by Tenants (US$ million) 15,200 
Export Value (US$ million) (2003) 5,960 
No. of Employees 137,029 
Country Profile of Tenants (by % of size of 
investment) 
Japan  13.4 
Singapore  22.7 
North America  19.2 
Europe  14.7 
Other Asian economies (and 
Oceania) 29.1 
Others 0.9 
Sector Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment.) 
Electronics/Electrical/IT/Software 58.8 
Precision Engineering/Mechanical 7.5 
Chemical/Pharmaceutical & 
Healthcare 
11.9 
Food & Beverage 5.8 
Light Industry 7.9 
Logistics and Supporting 8.1 
Others - 
 12 
 
Table 2: Factor influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in SIP 
(By Popular Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimates – Binary Logit) ψ φ 
 
pull factors frequency Rank Large Capital 
1.385 0.789 Political commitment from 
Singapore 7 13 0.102 0.530
-0.663 -0.676 Political commitment from China 38 3 0.307 0.492 
0.437 -0.766 Investment incentives 40 2 0.557 0.435
1.267 2.279 Efficient host government 
institutions 6 14 0.193 0.045 **
-19.529 0.624 Availability of raw materials 6 14 0.998 0.618
20.041 -18.211 
Competitive overheads 4 16 
0.998 0.999
-0.007 0.079 Availability of land 10 12 0.992 0.947
0.344 -0.446 Reliable infrastructure facilities 37 4 0.612 0.646
0.288 -20.284 Competitive labour costs 14 9 0.669 0.999
0.143 1.758 Conducive industrial relations 13 10 0.842 0.074 ***
-1.331 -0.764 Availability of skilled/educated 
labour 28 5 0.039 0.440 
0.109 -19.244 Good work ethics 15 8 0.906 0.999
-1.113 -1.292 Presence of major buyers 22 7 0.098 *** 0.271
-0.917 0.860 Presence of major suppliers 12 11 0.279 0.387
0.102 -18.483 Presence of major competitors 3 17 0.936 0.999
1.123 -0.030 One-stop service provided by 
CS-SIP 23 6 0.071 *** 0.976
1.099 -20.000 Access to overseas market 12 11 0.113 0.999
-1.030 19.757 Access to domestic market 43 1 0.160 0.999
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Table 3: Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in BIP 
(by Popular Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit) ψ, φ 
 
Push/pull factors Frequency Rank Large Capital 
0.292 1.232 Shortage of semi-skilled & skilled 
labour 18 7 0.647 0.204
0.089 -1.125 Shortage of professionals & 
managers 22 5 0.884 0.331
-0.678 1.045 Shortage of R & D personel 19 6 0.314 0.282
0.111 -1.374 Rising labour costs 25 4 0.855 0.235
-0.657 0.014 Low labour productivity 10 12 0.443 0.990
18.417 -16.607 High absenteeism 1 16 0.998 0.999 
-0.817 -0.133 Industrial relations problems 11 11 0.336 0.911
0.061 1.211 Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment 10 12 0.937 0.224
0.245 0.960 Difficulty in sourcing raw materials 12 10 0.730 0.330
0.969 -19.479 Difficulty in introducing & 
implementing new tech 8 12 0.220 0.999
-0.209 -0.810 Lack of good supporting services 18 7 0.745 0.486 
-2.079 -20.388 Difficulty in securing funds for 
expansion 13 9 0.058 *** 0.999
-0.715 1.161 High and/or rising overhead costs 30 3 0.244 0.
0.916 -19.141 Impact of government regulations 6 14 0.301 0.301
0.337 -2.051 Competition from overseas 
competitors 33 2 0.608 0.077 ***
-0.937 0.178 Competition from china-base 
companies 40 1 0.160 0.881
-0.194 1.302 Restricting mkt access to 
developing countries 4 15 0.873 0.307
-1.197 1.478 Restricting mkt access to developed 
countries 8 13 0.289 0.152
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression. 
          
φ
 p-values in parentheses are for 2-tailed tests. 
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
      *** Significant at 10% level 
      n.c. Non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
